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Cranesbill Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 8 (March 5, 2020)1
CIVIL APPEAL: HOA LIENS, PARTIAL PAYMENTS, SUPERPRIORITY
Summary
The Court determined that homeowners may cure defaults as to superpriority portions of
HOA liens much like first deed of trust holders; however, failure to explicitly or implicitly direct
allocation of payments by either debtors or creditors requires court intervention to decide what is
“just and equitable.”
Background
I.
This dispute arose when the former owner of 9352 Cranesbill Court (the Property) fell
behind on her payments to the homeowner’s association (HOA) for community assessments. The
HOA initiated foreclosure proceedings which involved recording a delinquent assessment lien, a
notice of default, and a notice of foreclosure sale. The superpriority portion of the lien totaled
$534. After receiving the notice of delinquency, the homeowner made partial payments to the
HOA in the amount of $798.50. Although the homeowner did not specify how she wanted the
HOA to apply the payments––to the superpriority or subpriority portions of the lien––if all of the
homeowner’s payments were applied to the superpriority, the sale to the holder of the first deed of
trust would have been rendered void. Despite the homeowner’s partial payments, she owed
$3,932.58 at the time of the foreclosure sale. The Property was purchased for $4,900 and deeded
to Teal Petals St. Trust.
Litigation contesting whether the sale extinguished the first deed of trust began between
the holder of the first deed of trust, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and Teal Petals and its assignors. The
case appeared before the district court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court
held because the homeowner’s payments exceeded the default superpriority lien amount, the
foreclosure did not extinguish the first deed of trust. As a result, the buyer’s assignee’s argument
that only the first deed of trust holder could cure the superpriority lien default was rejected and
summary judgment was granted to Wells Fargo and denied to Teal Petals.
Discussion
II.
Teal Petals, Appellant(s), asserted the homeowner’s payments could not cure the default
on the superpriority because it was in default when the foreclosure sale occurred and that sale
extinguished Wells Fargo’s first deed of trust. Teal Petals alternatively argued that even if the
homeowner’s payments could cure the superpriority default, it was not cured in this case because
there was no evidence the homeowner or the HOA allocated the payments to the superpriority.
Wells Fargo contended the district court correctly determined the homeowner and the first deed of
trust holder could cure the superpriority lien default.
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The Supreme Court of Nevada reviews grants or denials of summary judgment de novo
and determines summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact remain in
dispute.2
II.A.
The district court determined NRS Chapter 116 does not limit who can cure the default on
a superpriority lien and that it was possible for the homeowner’s payments to cure the default in
this case. The Appellants argued the district court erred because NRS 116.3116(2), the
superpriority lien statute, requires first deed of trust holder to cure such defaults.
Appellants relied on reports from the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts
to argue only the first deed of trust holder could cure the superpriority default; however, they failed
to provide binding legal authority or statutory language requiring the first deed of trust holder to
do so. Moreover, the Appellants did not provide binding legal authority prohibiting homeowners
from curing such liens. The Court noted that homeowners are in fact incentivized to cure
superpriority defaults to preserve the deed of trust. Relying on NRS Chapter 116, the Court
declined to find statutory support for Appellants’ arguments and found that both the first deed of
trust holder and homeowner have the option to pay off superpriority lien defaults. Thus, the Court
affirmed the district court holding that the homeowner could cure the default.
II.B.
Appellants further argued that if homeowners can cure superpriority defaults, the
homeowner in this case did not do so because her payments were less than the full delinquent lien
amount. Appellants also argued no evidence was produced to show the HOA applied the
homeowner’s payments to the superpriority. Wells Fargo argued the payments cured the
superpriority default because the amount of the payments exceeded the superpriority portion.
The Court relied on Able Electric, Inc. v. Kaufman, which addresses rules that courts follow
when deciding how to allocate partial payments. Able Electric states generally that debtors have
the right to make and direct an appropriation of partial payments, but when the debtor does not
direct the application of payments, the creditor may make the determination.3 If neither creditor
nor debtor makes a specific application of payment, it becomes a matter for the court to decide
using basic principles of justice and equity to reach a fair result.4 When applying the Able Electric
rule, this court has determined that “equity and justice” is best served through a disposition most
favorable to the creditor at the time of appropriation.5
Resolving this issue may vary depending on how the district court classifies the unpaid
HOA assessments and other costs the homeowner was required to pay––whether they were on a
running account and thus a single debt or multiple accounts. If the district court considers them to
be multiple accounts where neither debtor nor creditor exercised the power to direct application of
payment, the payment is to be applied to debts the creditor would have applied it to with regard to
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Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005).
104 Nev. 29, 30–32, 752 P.2d 218, 220.
Id. at 32, 752 P.2d at 220.
Id. at 33, 752 P.2d at 220.

the interest of third persons, the debtor, and the creditor.6 Generally, in that case, the payments are
allocated to debts to third persons.7
II.C.
The Court briefly discussed the parties’ failing arguments deciding 1) even if Teal Petals
qualifies as a bona fide purchaser for value, such status does not override the void sale resulting
from a foreclosure sale proceeding despite a cured default and 2) Wells Fargo cannot argue the
sale should be set aside as commercially unreasonable because the district court did not include
that determination in its order and this court does not address issues the district court did not
directly resolve.8
Conclusion
III.
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s legal determination that both
homeowners and first deed of trust holders can cure superpriority lien defaults; however, the case
was vacated and remanded for the parties to brief and for the district court to determine the proper
allocation of the homeowner’s partial payments.
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 260(1) (2019).
Id. at § 260(2)(a).
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